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Antipodean Encounters: Socratic Conversation and 
Ironic Redescription as Complementary Rhetorical 
Strategies in Richard Rorty’s Metaphilosophy 
Péter Csató 
“Conversation” and “irony” are central notions of Richard Rorty’s 
philosophy. Through the metaphorics of “conversation,” Rorty stresses 
the desirability of unbounded communication both among academic 
disciplines and in political practice. Moreover, Rorty conceives of 
philosophy itself as an ongoing conversation, in which the philosopher’s 
role is that of a “Socratic intermediary” (Mirror 317), a public intellectual 
conversant with several kinds of language games, practicing a kind of 
interdisciplinary cultural criticism. Thus, the conversational model comes 
to serve as the paradigm of antifoundationalist discourse, as conversations 
proceed without theoretical grounding or the control of a formalized 
discipline, while they require that ideas and arguments be formulated in 
terms intelligible to all participating interlocutors.  
“Irony,” on the other hand, argues for the value of idiosyncratic 
redescription, relating to such key conceptions of Rorty’s philosophy as 
“abnormal discourse” or “strong poetry,” which function both as vehicles 
of cultural progress and as quasi-poetic means of private self-fashioning. 
Irony—in its specifically Rortyan sense—requires a capacity to invent 
novel metaphors, formulate hitherto unimaginable patterns of thought, 
reveal or establish unforeseen relations. These “idiosyncrasies” can either 
be enlisted for the purpose of the social, cultural, political or scientific 
advancement of a community, or be so thoroughly “privatized” that they 
remain valueless or unintelligible to anyone but their inventor. In short, 
while conversation calls for the ability and willingness to come to an 
agreement on the rules of the language game being played, redescription 
in idiosyncratic terms aims to be incommensurate with all extant language 
games. 
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What my argument below aims to demonstrate is that “conversation” 
and “irony” are by no means mutually exclusive terms in Rorty’s 
metaphilosophical discourse. Indeed, they can be looked upon as 
complementary notions in the service of a radically antiessentialist agenda, 
whereby they denote rhetorical strategies, rather than individual tropes, 
deployed for the purpose of maintaining the discursive authority of Rorty’s 
neopragmatist idiom. 
The Antipodeans: conversation and redescription 
In his seminal Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty 
devises a short science fiction tale to illustrate his argument against 
dualism in the philosophy of mind.
1
 The Antipodeans, Rorty tells us, are 
“beings, much like ourselves—featherless bipeds, who built houses and 
bombs, and wrote poems and computer programs” (Mirror 70). They 
have a definite notion of what it means to be a person, as opposed to a 
robot or a pet, but they do not “explain the difference between persons 
and non-persons by such notions as ‘mind,’ ‘consciousness,’ or anything 
of the sort” (70). They also believe in immortality which, however, does 
not “involve the notion of a ‘soul’ which separated from the body,” but is, 
rather, a “straightforward matter of bodily resurrection” (70). Underlying 
these seemingly minor differences between their culture and ours is the 
fact that for the Antipodeans neurology and biochemistry were the “first 
disciplines in which technological breakthroughs had been achieved,” and 
so “a large part of the conversation of these people concerned the state of 
their nerves” (71).  
In other words, it does not take any professional expertise for the 
Antipodeans to be able to express their sensations, perceptions, or any 
experience in the language of neurology, for “their knowledge of 
physiology was such that each well-formed sentence in the language 
which anybody bothered to form could easily be correlated with a readily 
identifiable neural state” (71). Thus, the Antipodeans can describe pain on 
account of burning by reporting that their C-fibers are being stimulated, 
                                                 
1
 It is to be noted that I use the Antipodean-tale as a cogent demonstration of the specific 
problems I focus on below, without assessing the first-order philosophical issues it rais
es about the mind. For a detailed discussion of the tale, see Kenneth T. Gallagher’s “R
orty’s Antipodeans: An Impossible Illustration,” in which he discusses the self-referent
ial tensions of Rorty’s example.  
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the perception of an aesthetically pleasing red rectangle by saying that it 
“makes neuronic bundle G-14 quiver,” or feeling thirsty by claiming to be 
“in state S-296” (71). They cannot, however, make sense of the notion 
that the various neural states signify “peculiar and distinct sort[s]” of 
“mental states” (70). Apparently, these imaginary extraterrestrials are 
perfectly capable of functioning without positing an extra faculty (mind, 
“the mental,” etc.) beyond the boundaries of material explicability. They 
seem to have no need for any distinct conception (philosophical or 
otherwise) of what we, Earthlings, call “mind” to account for any 
nonmaterial aspect of their experience.  
A dramatic turn of events sets in with a team of various experts 
from Earth landing on the Antipodeans’ planet sometime in the twenty-
first century. The team comprises philosophers of both Continental and 
analytic persuasion, who give very different interpretations of the 
Antipodean predicament. The former sort holds the quasi-Heideggerian 
view that “there was no real problem about whether the Antipodeans had 
minds [...], for what was important in understanding other beings was a 
grasp of their mode of being-in-the-world” (73). Philosophers of the latter 
sort are designated by Rorty as “tough-minded,” who found “much more 
straightforward and clean-cut question[s] to discuss” (73). While the 
neurologists and biochemists from Earth are elated to find the 
extraterrestrials amazingly knowledgeable in their fields, the analytic 
philosophers on the expedition are all the more baffled by the apparent 
absence of the conception of mind from the Antipodeans’ philosophical 
vocabulary. “Though-minded” as they are, however, these philosophers 
“did not care what the Antipodeans thought about themselves, but rather 
focused on the question: Do they in fact have minds?” (73–74). 
Nevertheless, the questions by means of which they could determine 
whether the Antipodeans really have minds can only be formulated in the 
vocabulary of analytic philosophy, which cannot be separated from the 
assumptions that incite them to pose those questions in the first place. The 
Antipodeans, however, are unable to make sense of such individual 
vocabulary items as “raw feel,” cannot conceive of pain as different from 
stimulated C-fibers, nor can they tell the difference between “conceptual 
truth” and “empirical generalization” when reporting a sensation. Not 
sharing the terms and concepts whose mastery would be essential in order 
for the interlocutors to come to an even temporary agreement on what 
they are supposed to be conferring about, the attempt to answer the 
“straightforward question” of whether or not the outer space creatures 
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have minds inevitably results in a communicational impasse and the utter 
frustration of the analytic philosophers. 
Although Rorty’s primary purpose with this tale is to question some 
basic assumptions in analytic philosophy, it can also be read as 
thematizing three interrelated insights, which determine Rorty’s 
metaphilosophical position throughout his oeuvre: (1) philosophical 
problems and vocabularies are linguistic constructions, shaped by 
contingent historical, cultural, socio-political, and institutional factors, so 
it is misleading to believe that these problems are perennial “topics of 
concern to any reflective mind at any era and in any society” (Rorty, 
“Analytic” 125); (2) philosophical problems are not “natural explananda” 
which “arise as soon as one reflects” (Rorty, Mirror 3), but, rather, 
optional ways of interrogating issues which fall outside the realm of 
“expert cultures” (such as the natural sciences or specialized politics); (3) 
it is always possible to break free from a certain philosophical vocabulary 
and create a new one through the dialectical practice of offering 
alternative descriptions of the problems at hand so that they cease to seem 
relevant or problematic. 
In Rorty’s tale, it is not a disagreement between the two parties 
involved that leads to their failure to engage one another in meaningful 
communication. Instead, they come to a standstill because neither can 
have recourse to apodictic means of demonstration whereby to provide 
unfailing proof of the validity of their position. One can conceive of no 
demonstration or rational argument that could ultimately convince the 
Antipodeans that they have minds, or the analytic philosophers that they 
have encountered humanoids living without minds.  
In one of his recent writings, Rorty envisions an analogous 
problematic,
2
 relying on Wittgenstein’s “beetle in a box”3 for demonstra-
tion, and infers that “a descriptive term [cannot] have a sense if its 
application is regulated by no public criteria” (“Cultural” 11). Drawing on 
                                                 
2
 This time, Rorty’s example involves human beings with “consciousness” and “zombies” 
who “behave just like normal people, but have no inner life” (“Cultural” 11). 
3
 “Suppose everyone had a box with a beetle in it: we call it ‘beetle.’ No one can look int
o anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at hi
s beetle. – Here it would be possible for everyone to have something different in his bo
x. [...] But suppose the word ‘beetle’ had a use in these people’s language? – If so, it w
ould not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the langua
ge-game at all; not even as something: for the box might even be empty” (Investigatio
ns I.273). 
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the analogy, we can explain the communicational impasse in which 
Antipodeans and Earthlings find themselves by saying that they see 
different beetles (mind and neurons) in the same box (the human[oid] 
body). Nevertheless, this is not how the two interlocutors are likely to 
describe each other: from the vantage point of the extraterrestrials, the 
box seems to have no beetle in it, while the Earthlings blame it on the 
philosophical myopia of the Antipodeans that they cannot see even their 
own beetle.  
The tale itself is a metareflection, demonstrating that no vocabulary 
is ever safe from being displaced by another, no description can ever be 
the right and only description. This is why the vocabularies of neurology 
and biochemistry are capable of being substituted for that of the 
philosophy of mind, inasmuch as they provide more feasible descriptions 
of human experience without positing an invidious mind/body dichotomy. 
Nonetheless, abandoning a certain philosophical vocabulary or shifting 
from one description to another is not as innocent and unproblematic a 
process as Rorty appears to suggest. What he does not seem to take into 
consideration is that by giving up the intuition that the Antipodeans 
possess minds and have mental states, the analytic philosophers would 
eliminate a distinctive and constitutive element of their own philosophical 
vocabulary, thus jeopardizing the validity of any philosophical claim they 
might make both prospectively and retrospectively. For the same reason, 
the philosophers cannot afford to declare the operative terms of their 
vocabulary mere rhetorical configurations, without running the risk of 
putting in question the theoretical foundations of their philosophy, thus 
undermining its disciplinary status. Rorty champions conversational 
philosophy on account of his conviction that such cases of first-order 
stalemating can be resolved through moving the problems one level up, as 
it were, to a meta-level, at which one compares whole vocabularies rather 
than individual claims and arguments formulated in vocabulary-specific 
ways. This is precisely the kind of move that appears to clash most 
forcefully with his endorsement of the idiosyncratic discourses of the 
ironist. Nevertheless, as I will argue below, irony can be interpreted as a 
rhetorical strategy essential for the mode of operation of metadiscourses. 
132 
The (Socratic) ironist as “meta-metaphilosopher” 
The ironist, as Rorty tells us in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 
is a staunch antimetaphysician, who thinks “nothing has an intrinsic 
nature, a real essence,” and defies the metaphysician’s assumption that 
“the presence of a term in his [the metaphysician’s] own final vocabulary 
ensures that it refers to something which has a real essence” (74). The 
ironist “has radical doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses,” 
and “she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than any 
others” (73). Furthermore, ironists are “nominalist and historicist” by 
conviction, so they “see the choice between vocabularies as made neither 
within a neutral and universal metavocabulary, nor by an attempt to fight 
their way past appearances to the real, but simply by playing the new off 
against the old” (73–74). Ironists also realize that “anything can be made 
to look good or bad by being redescribed” (73). They come to occupy a 
“metastable” position (Sartre’s term)4, in that they are “never quite able to 
take themselves seriously because [they are] always aware that the terms 
in which they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of 
the contingency and fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their 
selves” (73–74). 
The ironist’s predicament is described in mostly negative terms as 
characterized by self-doubt and the inability to take herself or any 
vocabulary seriously. The ironist, however, does not seem to differ much 
from the Socratic intermediary, who is capable of mediating between 
various discourses and language games because s/he does not belong to 
any of them. To this extent, we may talk about a “Socratic ironist,” who 
might just be pretending to entertain self-doubt and a sense of 
rootlessness. In fact, just as Plato’s Socrates, s/he might engage in 
conversations, where s/he phrases his/her questions in such a way that 
each corresponding answer should strengthen his/her position, leaving 
him/her, at the end of the dialogue, in full possession of his/her discursive 
powers. One of the ways in which this feat can be accomplished is for the 
ironist to turn him/herself into a metaphilosopher, much like Rorty has.  
Nevertheless, self-evident as it may seem to view Rorty as an 
ironist, it seems all the more problematic to regard him as a meta-
                                                 
4
 Sartre defines “metastable” as pertaining to a “hybrid state”: it is “unstable and transito
ry [...] neither entirely perceptive nor entirely imaginative, that would be worth describ
ing for its own sake” (qtd. in Cumming 214).  
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philosopher. The slight transcendentalist tinge of “meta” arguably 
conjures up the image of the Platonic “philosopher king,” contemplating 
his domain from a regal distance. Habermas duly reads Rorty's “Meta-
philosophical Difficulties” (his famous introduction to the Linguistic Turn 
[1968]) as marking a “break in the history of analytic thought” (“Rorty’s 
Pragmatic Turn” 32), and sees Rorty’s metaphilosophical proclivity as 
part and parcel of his historicist outlook: “the metaphilosophical distance 
from which the editor [Rorty] comments on the texts [collected in the 
volume],” Habermas goes on to contend, “betrays the Hegelian message 
that every manifestation of Spirit that achieves maturity is condemned to 
decline” (“Pragmatic Turn” 32). Indeed, the ironist’s distance manifests 
itself not only in Rorty’s apparent unwillingness ever to adopt the rules of a 
language game other than his own, but also in his reluctance to take an 
atomistic view of the object of his analysis. In most of his work, he prefers 
to talk of historical epochs, rather than specific historical events, 
communities, rather than subjects, and vocabularies, rather than individual 
sentences (Contingency 5). This may contribute to the appearance that he 
acts as the philosopher king, whose reign he seeks to overthrow.  
His apologia rests on a pragmatic basis: “[w]hen we turn from 
individual sentences to vocabularies and theories,” he contends, “[the] 
critical terminology [we deploy] naturally shifts from metaphors of 
isomorphism, symbolism, and mapping to talk of utility, convenience, and 
likelihood of getting what we want” (“Pragmatism, Relativism” 163). 
This, however, does not exempt him from the semblance that he is 
reclaiming the authority he urges philosophers to relinquish. He may talk 
about “utility” instead of “accurate representation,” “hermeneutics” 
instead of “epistemology,” but he still seems to assume the role of the 
theorist who oversees philosophical culture from far enough to be able to 
judge which vocabulary promises to be of more utility than others.  
Even sympathetic commentators seem to be well aware of this 
tension, which they try to alleviate by palliating Rorty’s role as a 
metaphilosopher. Alan Malachowski suggests discarding the term 
“metaphilosophy” altogether in reference to Rorty’s work, contending 
that he does not “mak[e] claims about philosophical claims,” but rather, 
“at them” (Rorty 19). The “meta-philosophical level,” Malachowski adds, 
“is not an incommensurable platform,” which means that claims “made 
there can still be engaged by moves that belong within traditional 
[philosophical] debates” (Rorty 19). As opposed to this, the level at which 
Rorty’s discourse works, Malachowski concludes, “is a sort of extra-
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philosophical, performative level, a place outside philosophy from which 
words are issued to change what is going on there” (19–20).  
János Boros also cautions against the use of “metaphilosophy”: he 
points out that precisely because Rorty claims that criteria of vocabulary-
choice cannot be formulated by reference to a neutral and universal 
metavocabulary, viewing him as practicing metaphilosophy might create 
the misleading semblance that he is tacitly engaged in the kind of 
transcendentalist project he explicitly denounces (Boros 144). Since there 
is no conceivable place beyond or outside vocabularies (philosophical or 
otherwise), Boros contends, it would be less misleading to use 
“intervocabularity” in place of “metaphilosophy,” which argues for the 
ability to switch from one vocabulary to the other (144). This ability 
presupposes willingness to pick up the interlocutor’s vocabulary, rather 
than translating it into one’s own terms,5 or into those of a putative 
metavocabulary in the name of a universal understanding (Boros 144). 
Rorty himself, however, seems to be quite content to be called a 
metaphilosopher, or more precisely, a “meta-metaphilosopher.” Very 
early in his career, in 1961, he published an essay, which is lesser-known 
today, bearing the laconic title “Recent Metaphilosophy.” Although still 
in his “analytic phase,” Rorty clearly prefigures his subsequent pragmatist 
turn. It is in this early essay that Rorty most explicitly argues for the 
inseparability of interdiscursive communication (conversation) and 
metaphilosophy. Moreover, he identifies pragmatist metaphilosophers 
(which he was shortly to turn into) as “meta-metaphilosophers,” and 
contends in the tone of Mirror and his subsequent work: “[m]eta-meta-
philosophy makes possible communication among metaphilosophers,” 
adding that “since communication is the goal, rather than truth (or even 
agreement), the prospective infinite series is a progress rather than a 
regress: it becomes a moral duty to keep the series going, lest 
communication cease” (301–2).  
It is notable that even though Rorty’s philosophical outlook may have 
undergone a number of Gestalt-switches, much of his later work might be 
interpreted as so many ways of shoring up this early thesis. This 
assumption seems to be corroborated by the fact that even in one of his last 
essays, he echoes his younger self claiming that first-order argumentation 
                                                 
5
 See also Mirror (318), where Rorty defines the hermeneutics of conversation in these e
xact terms.  
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and second-order metareflection are indissoluble constituents of 
philosophical discourses: 
The question of whether philosophy should think of itself as a science, 
like that of whether it can be assimilated to intellectual history, might 
seem discussable without reference to substantive philosophical 
doctrines. But in fact metaphilosophical issues—issues about what, if 
anything philosophy is good for and about how it is best pursued—are 
inseparable from [first-order] issues about the nature of knowledge, 
truth, and meaning. (“Analytic” 122) 
It seems that insofar as he wishes to maintain the consistency of his 
philosophical antiessentialism, metaphilosophy becomes the most 
adaptable mode of discursive operation for him.  
Nonetheless, the double “meta”-prefix certainly cannot be 
overlooked. What it suggests is that Rorty sees the pragmatist 
philosopher’s task as consisting in the formulation of not even second-, 
but third-order reflections, as it were, adjudicating the extant meta-
philosophical vocabularies. Rorty does not elaborate on what enables the 
pragmatist metaphilosopher to occupy this position and where s/he is 
located in relation to second-order metaphilosophy. It seems, however, 
that the further the given discourse gets in terms of metalevels, the less 
appropriate it may be to call it “philosophy.” It is unlikely that Rorty, 
even as early as 1961, could have posited a sovereign discursive level 
three removes from actual first-order philosophical practice. Since he 
associates meta-metaphilosophy with communication, however, there is 
good reason to believe that the designation prefigures what he was later to 
call conversational philosophy, and the pragmatist meta-metaphilosopher 
anticipates the Socratic intermediary. 
Furthermore, the urge to occupy a meta-metaposition may seem like 
an attempt to escape the confines of first-order debates, and in this sense 
it can also be looked upon as a rhetorical defense mechanism, since it 
enables one to opt out of a given discursive predicament by appealing to 
second- or third-order considerations. Rorty might have developed this 
defense strategy in response to the immense amount of criticism he has 
received during his long and prolific writing career. Indeed, most of his 
commentators focus on Rorty’s philosophical output, apparently 
operating under the assumption that professional philosophy is the most 
appropriate interpretive framework for his arguments to be explicated. 
Many of the philosophical analyses of his work are formulated as first-
order arguments, oftentimes aiming to criticize his pragmatic stance in 
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relation to a host of philosophical problems (such as truth, meaning, 
reference, representation, epistemic justification, etc.) claiming that his 
understanding of these problems is partly or totally flawed.
6
  
Most of the time, Rorty fails to meet his critics on their own ground, 
and defends himself by arguing that the assumptions on which the 
diatribes are predicated lose their relevance when viewed from a 
pragmatist perspective. In other words, he resorts to his ironist strategies 
and opts out of the conversation. There is, however, another strategy, 
which is closer to the Socratic method. It consists in bringing round the 
interlocutor to his own position in a performative fashion, so that s/he 
cannot help but reaffirm his position. In what follows, I will focus on two 
such communicative situations. 
Socratic conversations: Rorty vs. Hilary Putnam and Barry Allen 
The debates between Rorty and his fellow-philosophers constitute a 
testing ground for his conversational philosophy. Refusing to abandon the 
philosophical/theoretical premises constitutive of their discourse, Rorty’s 
critics often point out either that, despite his endeavor to the contrary, he 
still operates under epistemological assumptions, or that the notion of 
conversation is too vague to have any explicative value in accounting for 
human knowledge. Malachowski delineates these two types of criticism 
by saying that there are detractors who interpret Rorty’s work as just 
another version of “arguing a case against philosophy-as-epistemology” 
(much like analytic philosophers do), and those who assume “that Rorty 
is not even trying to ‘make a case’ of any kind, that he has completely 
forsaken philosophy’s ‘normal discourse’ of ‘rational argumentation’ and 
is merely indulging in ‘rhetoric.’ Their verdict is usually equally 
complacent: Rorty's rhetoric can be ignored—so it is carry on as usual as 
far as philosophy-as-epistemology is concerned” (Rorty 64).  
                                                 
6
 The examples are all too numerous to be itemized here, but the tendency is clearly obse
rvable in several critical essays collected in various volumes, where the predominance 
of philosophical subjects delimits the critics’ understanding of Rorty (see Malachowsk
i ed. Reading Rorty; Herman J. Saatkamp ed. Rorty and Pragmatism; Robert Brandom 
ed. Rorty and His Critics; Charles Guignon and David R. Hiley ed. Richard Rorty). Hi
lary Putnam (especially in Realism with a Human Face) and Roy Bhaskar (esp. in Phil
osophy and the Idea of Freedom) figure prominently among the philosophers who criti
cize Rorty, in the name of philosophical realism, for his “frivolous” attitude towards e
pistemic justification, and his nominalist understanding of truth. 
137 
The critical reflections on Rorty’s work by two of his fellow 
philosophers, Hilary Putnam and Barry Allen, are cases in point. Rorty’s 
conversational philosophy proves successful in that it does indeed—as 
befits a Socratic intermediary—“lure” these philosophers out of their 
“self-enclosed” discursive practices. The desired conversation, however, 
cannot come to full fruition in accordance with the democratizing 
principles he valorizes. The reason for this is that Rorty’s critics, by 
(temporarily) forsaking their own discursive practices—performatively 
and not at the level of argumentation—do not find themselves in a neutral 
interdiscursive space, but in a metadiscursive one, where Rorty's “meta-
metarules” prevail. Putnam and Allen cannot help but play along.  
Putnam, in his critique of Rorty, points out a classical self-referential 
paradox to the effect that despite his pronounced antiepistemological 
endeavor, Rorty still persists in operating under epistemological 
assumptions.
7
 He contends: 
But notice that the very person who strongly denies that there is any such 
property as truth, and who waves his picture at us to call our attention to 
its various attractions, as, for instance, Richard Rorty does in Philosophy 
and the Mirror of Nature—notice that this very philosopher does not 
recognize that his picture is only a picture, but believes that in some deep 
pretheoretic sense his picture is the way the world is. (Realism 32) 
Addressing the problem of self-referentiality in a more substantive 
manner, he observes: “It seems [...] likely to me that [...] Rorty really 
thinks that metaphysical realism [inclusive of the representational view of 
knowledge] is wrong. [...] [B]ut this, of course, is something he cannot 
admit he really thinks. I think, in short, that the attempt to say that from a 
God’s-Eye View there is no God’s-Eye View is still there, under all that 
wrapping” (Realism 25). 
According to Putnam, Rorty errs twice: once by rejecting the 
contemplative moment of theoretical reflection, thus renouncing the 
privileged insight reserved for philosophers, and, second time, by being 
blind to his own tacit theoretical assumptions. Rorty, in Putnam’s 
                                                 
7
 See also Charles Taylor’s criticism of Rorty along similar lines. Taylor, while agreeing 
with Rorty’s critique of foundationalist epistemology, criticizes him in the name of an 
“uncompromising realism” which, he thinks, would lend substance to his antiepistemo
logical arguments. Taylor holds that Rorty’s “non-realism is itself one of the recurrentl
y generated aporiae of the [epistemological] tradition,” and sees him “as still very muc
h a prisoner of the epistemological world-view” (“Epistemological Tradition” 258). 
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interpretation, cannot admit he thinks any view to be wrong, otherwise he 
would betray his own conception of rightness and wrongness as functions 
of social practices. This assumption sits well with Putnam’s criticism of 
Rorty for what he takes to be his “cultural relativist” outlook (Realism 18-
26, 125).  
The real burden of Putnam’s criticism, however, is the claim that 
Rorty's denouncement of metaphysical realism can only issue from a 
“God’s-Eye View,” which, in turn, is identified as the essence of Rortyan 
thought concealed, as it were, “under all that [pragmatist/anti-
foundationalist] wrapping.” Thus, according to Putnam, he remains 
captive of the philosophical preconceptions
8
 he seeks to swing free from, 
thus being incapable of a plausible defense of his “antiphilosophical” 
claims without running the risk of self-contradiction. Putnam’s argument 
thus precludes the possibility of an open conversation between 
philosophical and nonphilosophical discourses by implicitly pronouncing 
professional philosophy a sealed vocabulary, incarcerating those who 
once get involved in any kind of philosophical discussion, and Rorty is no 
exemption.  
The case being made by Putnam is comparable to what Alexander 
Nehamas calls the “Protreptic Dilemma” (396), by which he refers to the 
fragment from Aristotle’s exhortation to “the love of philosophy,” which 
features a rather playful defense of the need to philosophize. On Aristotle’s 
account, philosophy is inescapable even if one self-consciously chooses not 
to philosophize, for in that case “we are obliged to inquire how it is 
possible for there to be no Philosophy; and in inquiring, we philosophize, 
for inquiry is the cause of Philosophy” (qtd. in Nehamas 396).9 As 
                                                 
8
 As a specific example, Putnam mentions that Rorty’s “analytic past shows up” in his re
jection of philosophical controversies which he thinks revolve around “pseudo-proble
ms,” such as those between realism and antirealism or emotive and cognitive content. 
According to Putnam, Rorty “scorns controversy” in a “Carnapian tone of voice” (Rea
lism 20). In his response to Putnam, Rorty admits to the “tone of Carnapian scorn” in 
Mirror, saying, “I should not speak, as sometimes I have of ‘pseudo-problems,’ but rat
her of problematics and vocabularies which might have proven to be of value but in fa
ct did not” (“Relativist Menace” 45). This rhetorical ruse is typical of Rorty’s discursi
ve strategies: he concedes the validity of the case his interlocutor makes against him, b
ut rephrases his earlier statement in such a way that it should only minimally modify th
e position for which he is brought to task.  
 
9
 The fragment, as quoted by Nehamas, reads in full: “If one must philosophize, then on
e must philosophize; and if one must not philosophize, then one must philosophize; in 
any case, therefore, one must philosophize. For if one must, then, given that Philosop
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Nehamas comments, the “argument depends on taking philosophy to be 
flexible enough to include as its own proper parts even attempts to show 
that it is an impossible or worthless endeavor” (396).  
From a Rortyan vantage point, the Protreptic Dilemma can be read 
in one of two ways. It can be interpreted as celebrating the discursive 
power of philosophy, in that the kind of “flexibility” the fragment argues 
for is, in fact, a way of empowering a discourse—indeed, an academic 
faculty—by proclaiming its quasi-oppressive ubiquity. In this sense, the 
Protreptic Dilemma reaffirms the very notion against which Rorty defines 
his antifoundationalism: that philosophical reflection (at least for 
someone even loosely affiliated with the discipline) is an inevitable 
exigency, being enforced by the nature of the “explananda” that arise.  
It can also be read, however, as advancing the notion that once we 
have appropriated the insight that philosophy is an optional 
social/discursive practice (which entails that we can stop playing the 
philosophical language game if we choose to), we must assess both the 
defense and the criticism of philosophy as emerging from within the 
practice,
10
 rather than emanating from a transcendental source beyond 
discourse. The defense of philosophy is no less in need of second-order 
deliberations than its critique, for specialized, first-order philosophical 
reasoning can neither plausibly defend nor voluntarily criticize the very 
discourse from which it derives its legitimacy. Thus, while the Protreptic 
Dilemma conceives of philosophy as an ever-extendible interior space, 
which cannot transcend itself even by self-reflectively accounting for its 
own practices, it makes a philosophically ingrained statement about 
philosophy, whereby, performatively, it turns itself into a meta-
philosophical reflection. It is certainly not a metareflection in the sense 
that it goes beyond its own discursive limits to occupy a transcendental 
standpoint from which philosophy can be evaluated in critical or 
eulogistic terms. Rather, the reflection is more akin to the rhetorical 
gambit Douglas Hofstadter dubs “going meta,” which is a self-reflective 
move whereby discussion is taken to a different (“higher”) level (22). In 
                                                                                                                        
hy exists, we are in every way obliged to philosophize. And if one must not, in this ca
se too we are obliged to inquire how it is possible for there to be no Philosophy; and i
n inquiring we philosophize, for inquiry is the cause of Philosophy” (395-96). 
10
 Richard J. Bernstein convincingly advances this notion when he asserts that we must s
hun the danger of “reifying the very idea of social practice and failing to appreciate th
at our very criticisms and arguments [formulated within the vocabulary of a discourse
] [...] are constitutive of traditions and social practices” (“Philosophy” 773).  
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the case of the Aristotle-fragment, however, it is not so much an intended 
gambit as a performative corollary of the self-reference. 
This kind of metareflection is observable in Putnam’s argument as 
well, insofar as he seems to be provoked by Rorty's “deprofessionalized” 
rhetoric to enter the metaphilosophical arena in defense of philosophy. 
Some of the statements Putnam makes are metaphilosophical in the 
Rortyan sense of the word, in that they are potential answers to the 
question of “what, if anything philosophy is good for and about how it is 
best pursued” (Rorty, “Analytic” 122). In keeping with Rorty's view 
about metaphilosophical reflection being inseparable from first-order 
philosophical issues (“Analytic” 122), Putnam prefaces his more 
substantive claims about realism, relativism, “warrant,” communal 
agreement, and social justification (Realism 18-29) by reflections on the 
nature and tasks of philosophy: “there is a sense,” he contends, “in which 
the task of philosophy is to overcome metaphysics and a sense in which 
its task is to continue metaphysical discussion” (19). At another point, he 
reflects: “I hope philosophical reflection may be of some real cultural 
value; but I do not think it has been the pedestal on which the culture 
rested, and I do not think our reaction to the failure of a philosophical 
project [...] should be to abandon ways of talking and thinking which have 
practical and spiritual weight” (20). Moreover, he makes it explicit that 
his reflections have been inspired by “a very fruitful ongoing exchange 
with Richard Rorty” (19). Rorty, thus, “charms” a “hermetic thinker” out 
of his “self-enclosed practices” by setting what Janet Horne calls a 
“baited rhetorical hook” (255). Rorty does not simply provoke 
conversation, but generates a discursive predicament in which his 
interlocutor is compelled to retort in accordance with his (Rorty’s) 
conversational strategies, that is, leaving first-order philosophical 
considerations behind and take the discussion to a metalevel.  
Barry Allen’s attack on Rorty's discursive view of knowledge 
illustrates the second type of criticism Malachowski adduces (one which 
accuses Rorty of being “merely” rhetorical rather than substantively 
philosophical). Allen impugns the conversational model of knowledge for 
its failure to answer the Socratic-Platonic question (familiar from Plato’s 
Theaetetus) of why knowledge is preferable to mere belief or opinion 
(230). Allen agrees with Rorty that representationalist accounts of 
knowledge are to be abandoned, but disputes that devising such accounts 
is the only alternative to Rorty's suggestion of giving up altogether on 
epistemology: 
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But isn’t that the real question—whether ruling out the epistemology of 
mirrors as good as proves the pragmatism of conversation? Have we an 
exclusive choice to make between metaphysics and sociology, mimesis 
and conversation, Platonism and Pragmatism? [...] The oppositions Rorty 
presents are not logically exclusive, so no objection against one side 
favors the other, and no argument can prove the negative proposition that 
there is no understanding of knowledge apart from the antithetical ones 
Rorty considers. [...] The question is not “how else?” [i.e., how else 
understanding knowledge is possible other than on a conversational 
basis]. It is why saying no to the epistemology of privileged 
representations is supposed to be as good as saying yes to Rorty’s 
pragmatism? (225) 
Allen suggests an alternative epistemology, one that is built around 
“artifacts [objects produced by our technological civilization], whose use is 
as social as conversation though there need be nothing linguistic or 
conversational about it” (226). His proposal that our adjudication of 
knowledge claims should be based on something “harder” than “mere” 
linguistic configurations is reminiscent of the Parmenidian skepticism about 
language and the Platonic contempt for rhetoric: Allen warns that 
knowledge is not to be confused with “prestigious talk,” that is, with the 
“communicative skills by which someone makes a case and persuades 
others” (228–29). The consequence of Rorty’s championing language over 
artifacts is that he “banalizes technical or artifactual practice by redescribing 
it in his relentlessly linguistifying terms,” so the “superiority” of one 
knowledge claim over another “becomes essentially rhetorical,” whereas 
“the knowledge mostly responsible for present-day technological 
civilization does not have this rhetorical, linguistic character” (231). Allen 
seems intent on avoiding idealist fallacies, so he insists that it is artifacts, the 
world of objects, that generates language, and not vice versa: “[w]e learned 
a new way of talking as a result of living with Maillart’s concrete bridges, 
but to confuse a new language-game with the artifactual innovation that 
gives it a point and material reference is to confuse a parasite with its host 
and make a mystery of both language and technics” (231). 
Rorty's response to Allen is typical of his argumentative strategies 
in the face of criticism. He concedes Allen's antirepresentationalist and 
nonidealist stance, but reflects that there is no point in making a sharp 
differentiation between artifacts and language, for “sentences, skills, and 
disciplines [...] can all be treated as artifacts” (Brandom 238). With this 
move, he has achieved that the debate goes on to proceed by the rules of 
his language game. He has appropriated Allen’s position and, thereby, 
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defused the critical force of his argument, which was predicated on 
positing the privileged status of artifacts as opposed to language and 
discourse. It is also characteristic of Rorty’s argumentation that he does 
not insist on the unconditional primacy of the discursive—as opposed to 
the “artifactual”—nature of knowledge, thus avoiding the mistake of 
setting up impermeable positions by positing immovable binaries. 
Instead, he advances the pragmatic notion that “it is hard to have the 
leisure for language-building if you lack non-linguistic artifacts with 
which to defend yourself against the climate and the predators. One can 
see why the two kinds of artifacts are likely to have been produced around 
the same time, and to have developed in tandem” (Brandom 239). 
Evidently, Rorty is ready to pick up his interlocutor’s vocabulary and 
refer to language (and discourse at large) as “artifact” without having to 
worry about giving up his position, since all this talk about language and 
artifacts remains implicated in discourse. 
Allen thus falls victim to performative self-contradiction when, 
negating Rorty’s claim, he asserts that 
[t]he important thing is the quality of the performance that puts 
knowledge into practice [rather than the conversations in which 
knowledge is supposed to be discursively formulated]. Such 
performances are at most occasionally dialogical, and are usually 
evaluated not by conversational consensus but artifactual reliability—not 
by anybody’s agreeing that a work is reliable or well done, but by its 
being so. [...] Conversation [therefore] is not the context in which it is 
ultimately decided what is knowledge. (232–33) 
The contradiction, at the most basic level, stems from the fact that 
Allen’s definitive statements about what knowledge is (and about what it 
is not) are actually formulated within the discursive confines of a 
conversation. Furthermore, “artifactual reliability” is not a free-floating 
value: at the very least, its recognition requires a set of in-place cultural 
practices which enable one to identify specific purposes that an artifact 
can reliably serve as opposed to other purposes for which it is utterly 
unsuitable. Allen’s distinction between an artifact being agreed to be 
reliable and its being reliable would make sense only if there were a 
transparent relation of correspondence between the purposes to be served 
and the artifacts available or yet to be made. This would be possible if the 
purposes were “given” in an essentialistic sense: not only presenting 
themselves in a self-authenticating fashion, but also marking out the 
artifacts most suitable to serve them. Nevertheless, there are no 
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indisputable criteria available in reference to which one could decide 
whose position contains more “prestigious talk” as opposed to 
philosophical substance.  
Furthermore, Allen’s criticism certainly misses the mark insofar as 
Rorty does not want to decide what knowledge is: “it will work better,” 
he replies to Allen, “just to drop knowledge as a topic rather than to say 
that I, and other critics, [...] have gotten knowledge wrong” (Brandom 
237). Rorty’s “Socratic ironism” is very much in evidence in this 
statement: if the desperate attempts to define the notion of knowledge 
result in more confusion than what they clarify, we are at liberty to 
eliminate the whole topic, that is, to change the subject when the ideal 
goal of continuing the conversation is jeopardized.  
Conversation and discursive authority (in lieu of a conclusion) 
Ironically enough, the Antipodean-tale, by depicting a paradigmatic 
case of a failed conversation, becomes an illustration of how 
communicational impasse occurs in an attempted conversation where one 
interlocutor tries to redescribe the other in the terms of his/her 
vocabulary, being convinced of its discursive supremacy. Besides being 
an imaginative jibe at some of the basic tenets of analytic philosophy, this 
illustration, on a more general reading, also points up questions about the 
interrelatedness of communication, ethics, and authority. It seems that 
despite Rorty’s professed anti-authoritarian persuasion and overtly 
emancipatory endeavors, we can read his texts as performatively evincing 
certain rhetorical strategies which appear to aim at maintaining the 
discursive authority of his own radically antiessentialist idiom.  
In contrast to received critical opinion,
11
 we can view these two 
rhetorical elements as functioning in a complementary fashion in his 
discourse, constituting a consistent metaphilosophical and political 
standpoint. According to this logic, Rorty’s concept of irony is an 
entailment of the latent authoritative purport of his conversational trope, 
                                                 
11
 Rorty’s critics—for instance, Nancy Fraser, Jo Burrows, Thomas McCarthy, Frank Le
ntricchia, and Norman Geras—object that the notion of conversation is all too vague t
o have any substantial consequence to philosophical discourse or political practice, an
d that his championing of private idiosyncrasy potentially propagates a kind of disside
nt irrationality, which not only blots out the ideal of conversation, but is also incompa
tible with his professed commitment to liberal democratic values.  
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thus Rortyan “ironism” can be viewed as a rhetorical means of discursive 
control, which serves to keep the conversational space safe for the 
normalcy of conversations. There are two senses in which the notion of 
irony, on Rorty’s hands, can function as a means of control: it can denote 
(1) his radical nominalism (linguistic antiessentialism), which enables his 
discursive operation to be kept at a constant metalevel; and (2) an entirely 
privatized way of self-fashioning, which, by the same token, keeps the 
“private ironist” barred from entering “public” forums of cultural/political 
conversation. In the first sense, irony acquires traits reminiscent of the 
Socratic method. “Private irony,” in its turn, can be interpreted as 
marking out the limits of public acceptability for a discourse, and as such 
part and parcel of Rorty’s normalizing intent. In this sense, the operative 
term is “private,” rather than “irony,” which can be applied to any 
discourse or utterance that harbors potential dangers to the given 
conversation. 
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